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ABSTRACT 
Employing the Annual Trade Policy issued each year by the Ministry of 
Commerce as a simplified case study, this paper examines the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of this policy instrument and the inherent inconsistencies and 
conflicting signals to the market that it contains. Capacity constraints and the 
lack  of  a sufficient belief  in the virtues of trade liberalisation  have led to  a 
situation where the more significant trade reforms have almost invariably been 
ushered in by the IMF/IFIs. It is argued that reforms under external influence are 
not  always  properly  sequenced,  and  are  seldom  of  a  lasting  nature;  that 
‘ownership’ of trade reforms can only be ensured when the policy-makers and 
the decision-makers come to understand trade policy’s role in nurturing quality 
institutional environment. This would require, inter alia, institutional capacity 
strengthening of the Ministry of Commerce (and its subordinate bodies) and 
giving it effective authority to formulate trade policy.  
JEL classification:  F13, O24, O19 
Keywords:  Public Policy, Trade Liberalisation, Anti-export Bias, Market 
Access, Trade Facilitation, Bound Tariffs, Trade Remedies, 
Entropy Index   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A  sound  public  policy  edifice  is  a  necessary  pre-requisite  for  good 
governance.  The  quality  of  policy,  in  all  its  aspects,  from  formulation  to 
decision-making, is a vital determinant of a Government’s ability to deliver. 
While the policy decision process in Pakistan is well understood, and adequately 
backed with the required statutory provisions, the policy-making process is less 
so. Equally hazy is the post-decision process: implementation, evaluation, and 
review of policy. 
This Paper attempts a more detailed look at the public policy apparatus 
through an assessment of Pakistan’s trade policy as it has evolved over the last 
ten years. The examination of how trade policy is formulated—and by whom— 
also brings out the capacity issues, both of making policy and implementing it. 
For  a  number  of  reasons  Trade  Policy  is  an  interesting  vehicle  of 
investigation:  it  is  being  constantly  reshaped,  not  the  least  due  to  the 
globalisation  imperative; there is a plurality of  actors involved; and  it has a 
significant bearing on public welfare. 
Pakistan’s  trade  reform  process,  initiated  in  earnest  in  the  late  1980s, 
intensified during the last ten years, especially the first half of the decade, that 
coincided with the ‘actualisation’ of WTO obligations and the IMF programme 
(2000–2004). The space provided by debt rescheduling and enhanced capital 
inflows  in  the  wake  of  9/11  and  certain  policy  adjustments  facilitated  this 
intensification as the traditional revenue and balance of payments arguments 
against trade liberalisation lost some of their urgency. 
While this paper’s primary area of investigation is the process of trade 
policy formulation in Pakistan, using the Trade Policy announced each year by 
the  Ministry  of  Commerce  as  a  case  study,  it  also  touches  upon  certain 
concomitant  issues  like  the  depth  of  reforms  and  the  likelihood  of  their 
sustainability.  It  looks  at  the  capacity  asymmetry  of  domestic  and  external 
actors,  and  tries  to  plumb  the  reasons  for  a  general  reluctance  to  liberalise 
despite sufficient empirical evidence to do so, especially in the context of export 
growth and investments that trade liberalisation is said to promise. Finally, it 
seeks  to  identify  the  major  issues  of  trade  policy  formulation  and  possible 
responses.  
II.  ANNUAL TRADE POLICY  
1.  The Process 
The Annual Trade Policy (ATP) is the successor to the annual Import 
Policy that was a major policy instrument at a time when imports were strictly 
controlled.  Once  imports started  to  get  liberalised  (with the  switch  from the  
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‘positive  list’   what  could  be  imported  and  under  what  conditions—to  the 
‘negative list’  everything importable except prohibited or regulated) the annual 
Import Policy lost its rationale and the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) chose to 
substitute it with the ATP
1 to reflect the shift in focus from import substitution 
to  export  enhancement.  (In  the  early  years  the  ATP  used  to  consist  of  two 
parts—the import policy and the export policy). 
Formal commencement of the ATP exercise is heralded by the meeting of 
the  Advisory  Council  around  end  April.
2  However,  ATP  formulation  is  a 
continuous  process  and  throughout  the  year  MoC  consults  individuals,  trade 
bodies, and government agencies. MoC also rakes old ATPs (to resuscitate good 
ideas inadequately executed), IFI/Donor reports, regional experiences, work of 
international organisations like UNCTAD, ITC etc. in search of ideas. Inputs are 
also sought from trade offices abroad, the WTO Mission in Geneva, and the 
Trade Development Authority (TDAP, formerly Export Promotion Bureau i.e. 
EPB). 
The ATP is approved by the Cabinet,
3  usually at a specially convened 
session that is also attended by the Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, the 
Governor State Bank and Secretaries of the relevant Ministries.  By and large, 
most Cabinet members tend to focus more on proposals pertaining to imports, 
generally resisting import liberalisation measures that are seen by them to be 
politically less palatable. 
There is little evidence of an extensive use of the usual policy-making 
tools (diagnosis, evidence-based research, development of policy options etc.). 
There appears to be a greater reliance on experience, close interaction with the 
trade, and a perceptive understanding of the issues in ATP formulation. 
Political interaction is limited to the consideration of the ATP proposals by 
the Cabinet. Parliamentary over-sight is virtually non-existent, especially since the 
Finance Bill does not include any ATP related demands. The occasional meetings of 
the Standing Committees rarely go into the details of ATPs.  
2.  Scope and Coverage 
While its thrust and style varies from Secretary to Secretary, the ATP 
generally consists of three parts: 
                                                
 
1There is not a good explanation for the ATP to be an annual feature, or for that matter to be 
announced after the budget. The business community, however, continues to look forward to it, 
partly in the expectation that the ATP will provide what the Finance Bill did not. The ATP rarely 
does so. 
2The Advisory Council is too large (200 plus members) and too diverse in its composition to 
be  an  effective  ‘advisory’  body.  It  rarely  meets  more  than  once  in  the  year,  but  its  meeting  is 
presented as ‘stakeholder participation.’ 
3Following the practice of the erstwhile Import Policy the ATP Summary for the Cabinet is 
marked Secret and rarely made available before the  meeting, denying  the Cabinet  members the 




(a)  Review of the preceding year’s import/export performance.  
(b)  Changes  in  trade  regime  warranted  by  bilateral/multilatera1/ 
plurilateral obligations, or for purposes of trade facilitation, or for 
removal of anomalies.  
(c)  Export enhancement measures. 
It is really the Export Enhancement Measures (EEMs) that constitute the 
‘centrepiece’ of the ATP. To have a summary view of the general thrust of the 
proposals contained in the last ten ATPs they have been classified into six broad 
categories. The number of initiatives taken in each category are tabulated in 
Table  1,  that  also  shows  the  number  of  proposals  that  were  actually 
implemented. (All the proposals are not necessarily ‘new’— there is a degree of 
repetition, or modification, of proposals contained in the earlier ATPs).  
Table 1 
Category-wise Number of Proposals and Their Implementation, 1999–2008 
Number of Proposals 
                Category  Made  Implemented 
1. Production/Export Assistance (Incentives)  54  41 
2. Customs Related  70  64 
(Zero Rating, Duty Free Imports, Bonding, Export 
Controls, Procedural Implements, etc.) 
3. Trade Facilitation  39  34 
4. Promotion and Development  76  36 
5. Infrastructural, Physical and Social  25  6 
6. Import Liberalisation  38  36 
 
The dominance of customs related EEMs that marked the earlier ATPs 
receded with the gradual removal of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and lowering 
of tariffs.
4  In the more recent ATPs the emphasis seems to be on incentives 
(freight subsidy, cheaper export re-finance, subsidised interest rates for capital 
investment, warehousing and offices abroad, rebates etc.)
5  and developmental 
initiatives.  The  ‘import  liberalisation’  proposals  mostly  pertain  to  the 
enlargement of the ‘positive list’ of imports from India, relaxation of restrictions 
on  import  of  second  hand  machinery,  and  removing  of  licensing/NOC 
requirements. 
                                                
 
4The  1999-2000  ATP  observed,  “...there  is  need  to  remove  those  barriers  that  inhibit 
exports. This is certainly not easy on account of the traditional focus on import substitution”. 
5There  is  sufficient  empirical  evidence  [see,  for  instance,  Azhar  (2001)  and  Haque  and  
Kamal (2007)] to suggest that barring exceptional circumstances subsidies do more harm than good, 
and indeed MoC sought to roll them back during 2000-02. But the Pakistani exporters do not see 
them as subsidies but ‘compensation’ for the cost penalties that are not of their making (e.g. over 
valued  exchange  rate,  inefficient  infrastructure,  erratic  power  supply,  preferences  and  subsidies 
available to their competitors etc.).   
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It has to be noted here that MoC’s trade policy initiatives are not just 
restricted to the ATPs and not all that it does gets reflected in the annual trade 
policy announcement. MoC does seek to influence, whenever it can and not 
always without success, various trade policy instruments, in particular the tariff 
policy, export refinance policy, and trade facilitation. It is also quite proactive in 
its interaction with the other Ministries on trade related deregulation matters. On 
occasion it develops strategic ‘visions’ as well that are based on sound analysis 
and are well articulated. (Textiles, Leather Goods, Engineering Goods, Rice, 
Horticultural  Products).  But  on  the  whole,  MoC  does  lack  sufficient  policy 
space  and  more  often  than  not  seeks  incentives  more  than  resolution  of  the 
structural problems.  
3.  Implementation 
There is a fairly prompt implementation of ATP proposals that require the 
issuance of an SRO, either by the FBR or the MoC. Proposals that require action 
by another Ministry can be more time consuming, notwithstanding the fact that 
being Cabinet decisions they are of a binding nature. Where MoC fails in its 
‘bilateral’ attempts it takes recourse to the ECC or the powerful Federal Export 
Promotion  Board  that  is  presided  over  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  whose 
Secretariat is the MoC. 
A full and proper implementation of ATP proposals, especially the more 
significant ones, shows at best a mixed record. For illustrative purposes Box 1 
summarises the implementation status, eleven months after the announcement, 
of the more pertinent measures announced in the ATP 2007-08. 
The real reasons for non or partial implementation appear to be  
(a)  Design flaws, emanating from inadequate research.  
(b)  Long gestation nature of some of the proposals.  
(c)  Ownership and funding issues.
6  
(d)  Capacity weaknesses of the principal implementing agency, the Trade 
Development  Authority  (TDAP),  and  inadequate  monitoring 
mechanism. 
[Implementation, of course, does not always mean achievement of the 
objective.  Implementation  of  the  proposal  to  set  up  the  Skill  Development 
Council,  for  instance,  does  not  mean  that  sufficient  availability  of  skilled 
manpower  has  been  ensured.  For  the  purposes  of  this  examination 
implementation is to be construed in the sense of output and not outcome]. 
                                                
 
6For several proposals requiring a financial outlay there is no ‘budgetary support’. MoC has 
to rely on the Export Development Fund (EDF, sourced from the 0.25 percent surcharge on exports) 
and the Export Marketing Development Fund (EMDF, financed from the Federal Budget. Before the 
textile quota regime expired an important source used to be the auction proceeds of ‘tree quota’ i.e. 
available to Government). Both these funds are of limited size and have large throw-forwards.  
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Box 1.  Implementation  Status ATP 2007-08 
Proposal  Current  Status 
Long Term Fixed Rate, Export Oriented Projects 
Financing Schemes to Additional Sectors 
Scheme being reviewed. 
EPZ Incentives to Export Oriented Units (EOUs)  CBR has issued SRO. Weak exporter response so far. 
Establishment of Equity Fund for Brand Acquisition 
And SPS Compliance 
TDAP consultant proposed to be engaged for pre-
feasibility study. 
First Year Allowance (FYA) for PME Investments  FYA already available under the current income tax 
regime. (Possible that MoC and FBR not on the same 
page).  
Export Credit Risk Management  PCI for GoP equity in Export Finance Guarantee 
Agency being processed 
Setting Up of Social, Environment and Security 
Compliance Board 
EDF funding approved. To Rs for Board being 
developed. 
Setting Up of Skill Development Council in TDAP  Being processed. 
Setting Up of Agri-marketing Integrated Centres  Being processed (Consultant and project co-ordinator 
to be hired. Private sector company has to be selected 
to manage AMICs for which PCI has to be prepared). 
Assistance in Reaching International Standards  Public Notice notifying the scheme and inviting 
applications is being processed. 
Financial Support for Compliance Certifications  Public Notice is being processed. 
Assistance for Opening Exporters’ Offices Abroad  EOIs invited from interested exporters 
Support for Marketing of Branded Products  Public notice being issued 
Retail Sales Outlets  EoIs being invited 
Overseas Business Support Units   Being processed. 
E-Marketing  Being processed. 
Financial Support for British Retail Consortium 
Certification 
Being processed. 
International Consultants to Identify Industrial, 
Agricultural And Service Sectors of Current And 
Future Potential And Prepare Short, Medium And 
Long Term Plans. 
Being processed. 
Inland Freight Subsidy For Engineering Goods’ 
Exports 
Being processed. 
Financial Assistance to Set Up Slaughter Houses  Being processed. 
Establishment of Women Entrepreneur Cities in 
Karachi and Lahore 
PC-1 being developed. 
Export of Pharmaceutical Products  Modalities for implementation have been worked out, 
in consultation with PPMA, and Public Notice being 
released. 
Appointment of Consultant to Support Production 
and Export of Japonica Rice 
Being processed. 
 
4.  Effectiveness 
There are no defined objectives of the ATP, rendering it difficult to assess 
its effectiveness. The goals are rarely explicit. There is a weak targeting effort 
(and therefore it tends to benefit the bigger exporters more) and vague cost and 
time lines. There does not seem to be a broad framework or strategy driving the 
proposals contained in the successive ATPs. Thus, more than a ‘policy’, in a 
strategic or directional sense, ATP comes across as a conglomeration of ideas 
aimed at facilitating greater exports. Trade liberalisation per se does not emerge 
as a major objective. 
An examination of ATP effectiveness, thus, has to be restricted to the 
contribution  of  ATPs  to  export  growth.  This  is  quite  challenging,  not  just 
because of the plethora of exogenous variables affecting outcome, but also the 
absence of studies or workings leading to the development of the ATP proposals  
10
to show the linkage between the proposed intervention and the likely export 
gain. 
An analysis (Box 2) of the Rapid Export Growth Strategy (REGS),
7 that 
was  introduced  in ATP 2005-06 and is said to be the basis for the  subsequent   
Box 2. Rapid Export Growth Strategy (REGS) 
Improved market access, promotional efforts in new markets, strengthened trade offices, skill and infrastructure 
development are stated to be the ‘pillars’ of REGS. These strategic objectives are to be achieved (‘tactical thrust’) through 
diversification, trade facilitation, competitiveness (‘reducing the cost of doing business’), capacity building (WTO and trade 
negotiations), compliance and quality infrastructure, export of services, and buyers driven FDI. 
For purposes of  an assessment  the specific measures proposed  in  the three  ATPs  (2005-06-2007-08) to 
support the objectives (categorised into seven major ones) are looked at to see consistency and outcome. (It is, of 
course, recognised that ATP is not the only vehicle to meet these objectives; they can be, and often are, pursued outside 
the ATPs).  
1.  MARKET ACCESS. A staggering number of PTAs has been finalised, more are being pursued (see Box 
4 for details). However, no progress has been possible in the principal markets (EU27 and US), except the 
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) initiative for the US market (no official assessment of the 
likely export gains of ROZs is available).   
In terms of outcome the PTAs are too recent to permit an assessment. The choice of partners (with the 
possible exception of China), however, does not promise a major export creation impact, at least over the 
short term.  
2.  DNERSIFICATION. For market diversification 13 ‘priority countries’ were identified in Africa, Latin 
America and the Central Asian Republics. The ATPs do not propose any specific measures to penetrate 
these  markets,  save  the  general  approaches  (local  marketing  executives,  honorary  Consul  Generals, 
exhibitions and delegations, warehousing) that are yet to be properly implemented. 
For product diversification several incentives were proposed for gems and jewellery, footwear, pharmaceuticals, 
horticultural and agricultural products, and engineering goods. The measures, by and large, are in the nature of incentives and are 
not robust enough to have a significant effect, nor do they address the real export inhibiting factors. 
No specific support measures were suggested for towel, denim, chemicals and services that were identified as 
‘focus products’ in ATP 2006-07 to increase their exports to $1 billion each by 2009. 
[Diversification  is  a  goal  that  has  so  far  eluded  Pakistan.  Appropriate  policy  options  to  deal  with  this 
important issue have not been developed. There are, for instance, those who hold diversification is more than a function 
of incentives and market access (especially where it does not factor in revealed comparative advantage). It is argued 
without fresh export oriented investments that ensure scale, technology and innovation, and superior managerial skills- 
and produce what the markets want rather than market what is produced- diversification will not be possible).  
3. COMPETITIVENESS.  ‘Reducing  the  cost  of  doing  business’,  and  ‘level  playing  field’  are  the  oft 
repeated  demands  that  have  been  met  through  ‘incentives’  to  the  extent  possible.  All  three  ATPs 
emphasise  ‘Domestic  Commerce’  as  a  means  to  improved  export  competitiveness.  Other  than  the 
establishment of a Domestic Commerce Wing in MoC, it is still ‘work in progress’. No progress is 
known to have been made on development of ‘competitiveness indicators’. It would appear a far greater 
effort, including at microeconomic level, is needed to meet this major challenge.  
4. CAPACITY  BUILDING.  There  have  been  weak  impulses  (TDAP  restructuring,  National  Tariff 
Commission strengthening, WTO and Trade Agreements, Trade Offices), mostly not fully implemented. 
Capacity remains a critical constraint.  
5. SKILL DEVELOPMENT. A Garments Skill Development Board has been set up. Certain selected units 
have been declared as skill development centres. In terms of outcome, the problem persists.  
6. SERVICES EXPORTS. Again, few and weak initiatives. Only one consultancy (architecture) has been 
completed, which is being processed. There is a recognition of the strong potential of export of services 
but the required roadmap and strategy do not seem to be in evidence.  
7. BUYER DRIVEN FDI. None of the ATPs suggest any specific measures. It appears this objective is 
being pursued within the overall FDI regime. Considerable investment has been made in the Textiles 
sector, and some in Cement and Chemicals (Ethanol), but this has been domestic rather than FDI. 
                                                
 
7An earlier ATP (2002-03) had spoken of a somewhat different ‘National Export Strategy’ 
whose  elements  were:  sound  macroeconomic  framework,  capacity  development  of  exporters 
(microeconomics), enhanced market access, reduced anti-export bias, improved social and physical 
infrastructure,  deregulation,  and  lowered  barriers  to  fresh  entry  (new  generation  of  exporters). 
Frequent changes to strategy underscore the inherent policy inconsistency.  
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ATPs  as  well,  fails  to  bring  out  a  strong  co-relationship  between  the  ATP 
measures and export growth objectives. The proposed initiatives are either too 
basic to have a salutary effect—of the ‘trouble shooting’ kind—or insufficiently 
prepared to tackle the issues constraining greater exports. REGS, for instance, 
rightly  dwells  on  ‘competitiveness’  but  offers  little  by  way  of  sustainable 
solutions that get to the heart of the problem. Even in the area of Market Access, 
where impressive progress has been made, at least in terms of the number of 
agreements made, the choice of preferential trading partners makes it unlikely 
that  it  will  materially  affect  either  export  diversification  or  growth  until 
appropriate investments are made to meet the demands of these markets. 
ATPs  (including  pre-REGS),  appear  to  have  been  more  successful  in 
Trade  Facilitation  and  a  more  open  import  regime.  While  the  influence  of 
external actors in this regard cannot be totally excluded several of the initiatives 
have been ‘home grown’ and motivated by export growth considerations.  
III.  TRADE POLICY BEYOND ANNUAL TRADE POLICY 
If the ATP has only a marginal relevance to its classical definition where 
are  the  contours  of  real  trade  policy  shaped  and  how  is  it  executed?  Not 
unexpectedly,  there  are  several  players.  Also,  other  policies  act  upon  and 
interact with trade policy. The more salient of these influences are discussed 
below.  
1.  Domestic Actors 
Ministry of Commerce may have the presumed responsibility for Trade 
Policy, and is required to ‘defend’ it at WTO’s six yearly Trade Policy Review 
at Geneva in the presence of all member states, but in actual practice several 
critical  tools  of  Trade  Policy  (tariffs,  concessional  SROs,  simplification  of 
Customs procedures and related trade facilitation, exchange rate, payment terms, 
conditions of repatriation of export proceeds, export finance rates and caps, etc.) 
are beyond its domain. Even in the more narrow interpretation of trade policy, 
i.e. exports enhancement, Ministry of Commerce is not unhindered. It is only in 
matters falling under the Import and Export (Control) Act, that is administered 
by MoC and relates more to conditions and procedures of import/export, that it 
has  exclusive  jurisdiction,  though  it  has  to  depend  upon  the  Customs  for 
implementation.
8 
The  fact  is  that  several  important  actors  inhabit  the  Trade  Policy 
formulation arena, the principal being the Central Board of Revenue (now FBR) 
and the State Bank. For sectoral measures Ministries of Agriculture, Industries, 
                                                
 
8Under the Rules of Business the Commerce Division’s remit includes ‘import and export’ 
regime  (including  related  treaties  and  agreements),  ‘tariff  (protection)  policy  and  its 
implementation’, and ‘export promotion’ .  
12
and Privatisation and Investments are the key players. Provincial Governments, 
too, weigh in (for instance when the Sindh Government chose to levy a ‘cess’ on 
imports that amounted to para-tariffs). Most recently, the Planning Commission 
has pitched in with its ‘Export Plan-Pakistan Inc.’ that proposes a roadmap to 
take exports to $40 billion plus by 2013, prompting WTO’s December 2007 
Trade  Policy  Review  to  observe  that  the  Planning  Commission  ‘is  actively 
involved  in  setting  trade  policies,  including  export  promotion  and  trade 
development.’ 
While a division of powers is very much in the scheme of things what the 
examination of the prevalent system unmistakably brings out is the absence of a 
strong and well equipped focal point for Trade Policy formulation. This has 
contributed to the striking absence of an overall strategic framework, shared and 
owned by all the players, to drive trade policy. Interestingly, GoP’s Rules of 
Business do not assign Trade Policy to any Ministry. In fact trade policy as such 
is not mentioned at all. Apparently, the Government does not perceive trade to 
require a distinct and specific policy field; rather an outcome of other policies.
9  
2.  Outside Influences 
Being  a  ‘founding  member’  of  the  WTO,  the  pains  of  the  complex 
‘accession process’ that usually requires a large liberalisation effort, were not 
visited upon Pakistan. Several WTO provisions, most notably the Special and 
Differential treatment (even though it is largely of the ‘best endeavour’ kind), 
that allowed the Developing Countries either exemptions or more time, gave 
sufficient room for manoeuvre. Except where self-motivated, or propelled by 
IMP / IFIs, Pakistan by and large sequenced the WTO commitments at a pace of 
its own choosing. For instance, it secured more time for compliance of Trade 
Related  Investment  Measures  (TRIMs),  Agreement  on  Customs  Valuation, 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and where it was tardy 
(e.g. requirement of ‘Notifications’) it only got gentle reminders. Pakistan also 
took its time in getting its tariffs ‘bound’ (i.e. the tariffs cannot be increased the 
beyond the rate notified to the WTO, except where an exemption is obtained for 
balance of payments reasons), and barring the Textiles related tariffs that were 
bound at the level of applied rates (as part of Pakistan’s protracted negotiations 
with the EU to secure duty free market access), the bound rates are much higher 
(about four times) than the applied rates. In essence, WTO on its own has hardly 
sent Pakistan scurrying to the trade reform drawing board. 
The real thrust for trade policy reforms has come from the IFIs and the 
IMP. It was especially quick and intense in the first half of this decade. To 
                                                
 
9Shahid  Javed  Burki  notes:  “Public  policy  in  Pakistan  has  never  explicitly  looked  at 
international trade as a contributor to economic growth, poverty alleviation, and improvement in 
income distribution... When policy makers have turned to trade, they have done so to improve the 
balance of payments situation.” [Burki (2008)].  
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nudge Pakistan on the path of liberalisation, IMP came in with performance 
criteria  and  structural  benchmarks,  prior  actions  and  conditionalities
10  in  its 
Stand By Arrangement and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The World 
Bank  and  Asian  Development  Bank  paved  the  way  by  piggy-backing  these 
reforms on their substantial loans.  
3.  Market Access 
Arguably, the only area of trade policy that was genuinely ‘home grown’, 
and not influenced by IMP/IFIs, was the almost relentless pursuit of preferential 
trading  arrangements (PTAs).  This is a significant departure from Pakistan’s 
traditional  approach  of  liberalising  trade  either  unilaterally  or  multilaterally. 
Greater  market  access  and  diversification  are  the  stated  objectives  but  the 
proliferation of preferential arrangements elsewhere, that have put Pakistan’s 
exports at a disadvantage, has no doubt been an important consideration. Box 4 
summarises the various PTAs that Pakistan has and is seeking.  
Box 4. Pakistan’s PTAs 
Pakistan now is a member of four regional / plurilateral PTAs: SAFTA 
(2006,  with  SAARC),  PRETAS  (2005,  with  OIC  countries,  target 
effectiveness date 1 Jan. 2009), ECOTA (2003, with ECO countries, yet to be 
ratified  by  the  requisite  number  of  countries),  and  D-8  PTA  (Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Turkey. Yet to be 
ratified).  
Pakistan  also  has  bilateral  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTA)  with  Sri 
Lanka  (2005),  Iran  (2006),  China  (2007),  Malaysia  (2008),  and  Mauritius 
(under implementation). It is also negotiating FTAs with Singapore and the 
Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) and pursuing various forms of preferential 
trading arrangements with Turkey, MERCOSUR, EFTA and some 20 other 
countries. With the U.S., despite the long negotiated Trade and Investment 
Framework  Agreement,  an  FTA  remains  a  forlorn  hope,  though  the 
authorities are quite excited with the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones bill 
currently under consideration of the U.S. Congress. With the EU the duty-free 
market  access  secured  after  long  negotiations  on  a  quid  pro  quo  basis—
clearly  a  spectacular  highlight  of  Pakistan’s  trade  diplomacy—was  lost  in 
2005.  It  also  did  not  qualify  for  EU’s  GSP+  arrangement  for  sustainable 
development  and  good  governance,  leading  the  authorities  to  claim  that 
Pakistan has been unfairly discriminated against. FTA with EU remains a 
high priority despite the European Commission’s current reluctance. 
                                                
 
10Ishrat  Hussain  highlights  the  sheer  volume  of  the  required  actions:  “The  performance 
criteria had five pages of footnotes on adjusters, qualifiers, and precise numbers to be achieved.”      
[Hussain (2003)].  
14
FTA/PTA  based  Market  Access  has  clearly  emerged  as  Pakistan’s 
principal trade policy instrument. While the concluded FTAs/PTAs are of too 
recent a vintage to permit a fair evaluation, the overall approach does raise some 
concerns. Besides the glaring capacity constraints to negotiate, and implement, 
such a large number of FTAs/ PTAs, with a noticeable degree of overlap, the 
trade regime is likely to become more complex and more uncertain. Further, as 
each FTA/PTA requires preferential tariff treatment there will be a temptation to 
keep the MFN duty rates high to permit future concessions. There is also the 
fear  that  the  multiplicity  of  these  agreements  could  be  efficiency-reducing, 
divert more trade than they create,
11 and induce sub-optimal trade patterns.
12   
The advantages of PTAs also get diminished in one other important aspect if 
not  proactively  pursued:  using  market  access  as  a  tool  to  attract  foreign  direct 
investment. If an FTA/PTA is a genuine means of freer access to a market it should 
automatically create interest among foreign companies to invest in Pakistan to take 
advantage of lower tariffs on made in Pakistan goods. It is not known how Pakistan 
proposes to ‘market’ its PTAs to induce export oriented FDI.  
4.  Trade Remedies 
While actively pursuing the trade openness agenda in the early part of this 
decade Pakistan does not seem to have paid equivalent attention to defence remedies 
and legitimate safeguard actions. Having been obliged, with good reason, to do away 
with  Regulatory  Duties,  which  was  a  quick  and  convenient  way  to  defend  an 
industry against a surge of imports, Pakistan was slow to put in place an effective 
defence mechanism. The time it took to prepare WTO compliant laws,
13 reform the 
NTC  (National  Tariff  Commission,  the  institution  responsible  for  contingency 
protection), and the complexity of filing the cases before the NTC, put the affected 
domestic producers under severe pressure, and proved fatal for some SMEs. 
Pakistan has not taken any countervailing or safeguard actions.
14 In anti-
dumping it carried out 24 investigations and imposed 19 measures (India, in 
contrast, has taken several times more measures over an equivalent period).  
IV.  EXTENT OF REFORMS 
The  IMF  led  trade  reforms  of  this  period  were  quite  deep  and  wide-
ranging.  They  went  beyond  tariff  reduction  and  removal  of  quantitative 
restrictions to embrace virtually every facet affecting trade: from exchange rate 
mechanism to production/export assistance, to state trading. Some of the major 
reforms are summarised in Box 3. 
                                                
 
11Word Bank (2006).  
12Tumbarello (2007). 
13The Anti-Dumping Duties Rules were finalised in 2001, the countervailing Duties Rules in 
2002, and Safeguard Measures Rules in 2003. 
14The sole safeguards investigation, on footwear imports, was terminated in August 2005.  
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Box 3. Summary of Trade Reforms 
1.   Import Related 
 
Almost all QRs removed. Restrictions on imports from India and on second hand machinery 
being continuously relaxed 
 
Requirement of importer registration (with EPB) done away with 
 
Licensing requirement minimised 
 
LC margin requirements withdrawn 
 
Import Policy and Procedures rewritten for greater simplicity and transparency 
 
Afghanistan Transit Trade rules liberalised 
 
Local content conditions withdrawn 
2.  Export Related 
 
Export bans! restrictions on almost all products removed 
 
Minimum Export Prices withdrawn 
 
Export duties withdrawn 
 
Most export subsidies withdrawn 
 
Registration (of exporters) requirement withdrawn 
 




Maximum tariff rate reduced to 25 percent (except automobiles/luxury items) 
 
Simple average MFN rate down to 14.5 percent (import weighted even lower) 
 
Almost all tariff rates have been bound with WTO 
 
Most rates are on ad valorem basis 
 
Duty slabs reduced to four 
 
Regulatory duties (as contingent protection measure) done away with 
 
Number of concessionary SROs substantially reduced 
 
Para tariffs largely merged 
 
Customs valuation shifted from ‘Import Trade Price’ basis to transaction value 
4. Custom Procedures and Trade Facilitation 
 
Single Administrative Document (SAD) introduced, (in place often different documents that 
used to be required) 
 
Electronic documentation and clearance introduced. Physical cargo inspection rates reduced to 
4 percent 
 
Steps needed to clear vessels reduced from 26 to one; clearance time shortened to about eight 
hours; part dwell times reduced from 11 to 4 days 
 
Revised Kyoto Convention acceded to in addition to Nairobi and Istanbul Conventions  
5. State Trading 
 
Rice and Cotton Export Corporations wound up 
 
State trading restricted to exceptional circumstances, (through TCP, which does not have any 
exclusive rights or duty preferences)  
6. Others 
 
Compliance with all WTO commitments 
 
Standards harmonised with international requirements 
 
Imported and domestic goods undergo the same conformity testing procedures 
 
Exchange rate mechanism reformed 
 
Export refinance rates made market compatible 
 
Paris, New York, ICSID conventions acceded to  
 
Telecom sector deregulated 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties signed with 48 countries. 
 
FDI regime made more attractive 
 
Extensive Financial Sector Reforms 
 
Competition Commission set up (replacing Monopoly Control Authority) Intellectual Property 
Rights Organisation set up. 
N.B. some of theses measures may have been rescinded or modified in recent years.  
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These reforms had a significant effect on Pakistan’s trade openness (trade 
measured  as  a  ratio  of  GDP).  Imports  and  exports  as  a  percentage  of  GDP 
improved from 25.7 percent to in 2001-02 to 32.7 percent in 2005-06, before 
declining to 30.4 percent in 2006-07. (Figure 1).  
Fig. 1.  Trade Liberalisation Indicators 
Source: SBP.  
The most glaring impact was on tariff structure (Table 2), with the simple 
average (unweighted) MFN tariff rate coming down to 14.5 percent in 2007-08 
compared  to  about  45  percent  a  decade  earlier.  (Figure  2).  Import  weighted 
average tariff came down to 8 percent and average effective rate to 7.6 percent.  
Fig. 2.  Average Import Tariff Rates 
Source: UNCTAD (Trains).  
About 40 percent of the tariff lines now attract a duty rate of 5 percent or 
less (Figure 3). Tariff dispersion and escalations were also positively affected. It 
has  to  be  noted  that  lower  tariffs  did  not  adversely  affect  import  related 
revenues. In fact tariff revenue as a percentage of total tax receipts they went up 
from  15.3  percent  in  2001-02  to  20  percent  in  2006-07  because  of  greater 
imports and the levy of General Sales Tax on several products at the import 
stage.  
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Table 2  
Pakistan’s Tariff Structure, 2001-02 and 2004-08  
2001-02  2004-05  2005-06  2006-07  2007-08 
Bound Tariff Lines (% of All Tariff Lines)  36.6  –  98.4  98.0  98.0 
Simple Average Applied Rate 
Agricultural Products 
Industrial Products 
WTO Agricultural Products 
WTO Non-agricultural Products 































Domestic Tariff “Peaks” (% of All Tariff Lines)ª  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.1 
Overall Standard Deviation of Tariff Rates  16.0  11.9  11.0  11.3  11.7 
Coefficient of Variation of Tariff Rates  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Duty Free Tariff Lines (% of All Tariff Lines)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.8 
Non-ad Valorem Tariffs (% of All Tariff Lines)  0.9  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6 
Source: WTO. 
ªDefined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied rate.  
Fig. 3.  Distribution of MFN Tariffs, 2001-02 and 2007-08 
Source: WTO. 
Note: Calculations exclude specific rates and include the ad valorem part of compound rates. Data 
points above the bars denote the share of total lines. 2001-02 tariff consists of 5477 tariff lines 
and 2007-08 consists of 6909.   
Have these tariff reforms been deep enough? Pakistan’s ‘foreign partners’ 
do  not  seem  to  think  so.  The  WTO  finds  Pakistan’s  reforms  to  have  been 
‘uneven’ since its last review of Pakistan’s Trade Policy [WTO (2007)].  World 
Bank  thinks that although lower, ‘the anti-export bias from tariffs and other 
trade  restrictions  remains  high  favouring  import  substitution  and  reducing 
Pakistan’s resource-use efficiency, export competitiveness, and diversification’ 
[World Bank (2006)].
15  World Bank’s concerns ‘informally shared’ with GoP 
authorities  are  said  to  be  more  stringent.  Both  IMF  and  ADB,  in  their 
discussions with the authorities, are also said to stress the need to persist with 
                                                
 
15Using the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI), that computes the tariff equivalent 
of a country’s import restrictions, World Bank researchers find a 21  percent equivalent import tariff 
rate  for Pakistan—lower than  India, Malaysia, the  Philippines, and Bangladesh;  higher than  Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and Turkey. [Kee, et al. (2006)].  
18
trade  reforms.  This  is  also  the  underlying  message  of  some  of  the  studies 
commissioned under the Competitiveness Support Fund.  
V.  TRADE POLICY CONSISTENCY 
Technically  speaking,  Pakistan  is  correct when  it  claims  that  its  trade 
liberalisation  has  been  ‘autonomous’.  Behind  the  scenes,  though,  it  remains 
mindful of the ‘Washington Consensus’ even after the ‘successful completion’ 
of  the  IMF’s  Poverty  Reduction  and  Growth  Facility.  Despite  this,  recent 
evidence  tends  to  suggest  a  growing  incidence  of  ‘backsliding’,  raising  the 
question of the sustainability of the trade reforms process. 
While  the  recently  introduced  import  tightening  measures  (increased 
duties and GST, some para-tariffs, LC margins) can perhaps be defended on 
account of the extraordinary growth in trade deficit,
16   early indications of at 
least some roll-back were already there, especially since the ending in 2002-03 
of  the unilateral ‘tops down’  tariff  programmes.  The process of roll-back of 
Production and Export assistance (subsidies) has been stalled and even reversal 
in certain cases. Several measures that tend to exacerbate tariff disparities and 
dispersion were taken. The Regulatory Duty (RD) provisions were amended to 
take  away  NTC  role  and  the  condition  of  limiting  RD  applicability  to  a 
maximum duration of one year. Commitment to phase out concessionary SROs 
seems to have been put on hold, and the number of duty slabs almost doubled 
since 2002-03. [This sampling of apparent ‘reversals’ is not intended to question 
the quality of decisions but merely to illustrate the directional change]. 
Besides  the  inconsistencies  there  also  seem  to  be  certain  inherent 
contradictions. If the avowed, if not the principal, aim of Trade Policy is export 
growth, do not the more recent policy moves militate against exports? Higher 
effective rate of protection will accentuate the anti-export bias by making the 
domestic market more profitable. Also, tariffs are an implicit tax on exports, and 
as  Tokarick  argues  they  discourage  exports  by  raising  the  cost  of  imported 
inputs. [Tokarick (2006)]. Already low import content is one of the obstacles to 
greater exports which will be exacerbated by costlier imports. This will also 
mean greater reliance on duty neutralising schemes that have high transaction 
costs and divert exporter attention from marketing to refunds. 
Again,  direct  export  subsidies  are  counter-productive.  They  distort 
investment  decisions  and  encourage  rent-seeking.  In  the  ultimate  analysis  it 
becomes  a  zero  sum  game  and  often  you  require  more  subsidies  as  the 
competitors up theirs, in response to yours, to maintain your current levels of 
export. Subsidies also tend to depress unit prices as at least in part they have to 
be passed on to the buyer. 
                                                
 
16Some  will  no  doubt  question  the need  for such  measure  given  the  recent  close  to  15 
percent depreciation of Pak Rupee, besides the ‘inelasticity’ of most imports.  
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What could be the explanation for these policy inconsistencies, that also 
cast a shadow over the sustainability of the trade reform process? Would the 
policy attitude have been different if the nexus between trade liberalisation and 
growth and welfare gains was more explicit and better understood? 
There  is  a  considerable  body  of  literature  based  on  cross-country 
investigations  to  suggest  a  positive  relationship  between  trade  openness  and 
economic performance.
17   Indeed, the well-known work of Frankel and Romer 
(1999) concludes that a one percentage point increase in trade-to-GDP ration 
leads to a 2 percent increase in per capita income. Even the sceptics such as 
Rodrik and Stiglitz do not oppose trade liberalisation per se but qualify it: the 
former  to  the  need  for  institutions  and  policies  to  manage  downside  risks 
[Rodrik  (2002)]  and  the  latter,  additionally,  to  the  need  to  balance  the 
asymmetry  of  trade  relations,  where  the  developing  countries  open  up  their 
markets  to  goods  from  the  advanced  industrial  countries  without  full 
reciprocation. [Stiglitz (2006)]. 
It will be difficult to irrefutably establish the virtues of trade liberalisation if 
seen, as is often the case in Pakistan, through the narrow prism of sale of goods and 
services to earn foreign exchange. In Pakistan’s case exports did start to grow, 
almost as soon as the deeper trade reforms had been implemented, maintaining a 
compound annual growth rate of 16 percent between 2002 to 2006, before tapering 
off to about 3 percent last year (a likely 10 percent this year). (Figure 4).  
Fig. 4.  Export Growth Rate 
 
However, this more than doubling of export value over the decade loses 
much of its lustre when viewed in the context of the following factors:  
(a)  The extraordinary advantage of duty-free market access to EU, Jan 
2002 to Dec. 2005 (This also had a positive sympathetic effect on the 
other markets, especially the U.S.)  
(b)  Emergence of Afghanistan as Pakistan’s third largest market, post 9/1l.  
                                                
 
17See for instance, Sachs and Warner (1995), Bhagwati (2004), Winters, McCulloch, and 
Mackay (2004), Edwards (1998).  
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(c)  Higher  growth  rates  of  competitors  (China,  Vietnam,  Bangladesh, 
India, Sri Lanka).  
(d)  There was little product or market diversification, as SBP’s entropy 
index establishes [SBP (2007)]. 
Contrariwise, there are certain exogenous factors that contributed to the 
recent slowing down of the growth rate, besides of course the continual anti-
export bias referred to above:  
(a)  Higher inflation rate relative to trading partners (Relative Price Index) 
causing  a  continuous  appreciation  of  real  effective  exchange  rate 
since 2003-04.  
(b)  Withdrawal of duty-free access to the ED market.  
(c)  Accession of Vietnam to WTO and expiry of safeguards on Chinese 
textile exports.  
(d)  Market access challenges. According to a World Bank study [Kee, et 
al. (2006)] Pakistan had the fourth lowest market access among 91 
economies  for  which  the  Market  Access  Overall  Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MAOTRI)
18 was computed.  
(e)  Reluctance of buyers to visit Pakistan. 
Notwithstanding  these  external  shocks  the  decision-maker  is  less  than 
convinced that trade openness has had a significant impact on export growth. 
The fact that compared to competition Pakistan has had a low Export/DP growth 
rate (Figure 5), and that the share of exports in GDP declined from 12.6 percent 
in 2001102 to 11.8 percent  in 2006-07, is often cited. Some also suspect that the   
Fig. 5.  Average Per Annum Growth in Exports/GDP, 1990–2004 
Source: WTO, World Trade Data. 
                                                
 
18MAOTRI measures the tariff equivalent of trade restrictions on a trading partner’s exports. 
Among  selected  Asian  economies  (including  China  and  India)  Pakistan  faced  the  highest  tariff 
equivalent of 8 percent. Sri Lanka was second with 22 percent.  
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‘real’  export  growth  figure  could  be  even  lower  because  of  the  reported 
incidence of over...invoicing.
19 
Behavioural response to trade liberalisation of other key variables—GDP 
Growth, Inflation, Employment, Poverty, Income Distribution, Investments—using 
Pakistan-specific  empirical  evidence,  has  not  been  sufficiently  researched  to 
establish a clear co-relationship. There are few forward-looking or counterfactual 
simulations available to guide the policy maker. Where an attempt has been made, 
for instance the trade liberalisation—poverty reduction nexus, a positive relationship 
has been concluded,
20,21   but even here it has been difficult to isolate the effect of 
trade  liberalisation  alone.  The  policy  makers  in  Pakistan  continue  to  perceive 
poverty  reduction  as  a  derivative  of  growth;  and  they  are  sceptical  if  trade 
liberalisation has been the major impulse in this regard. 
There  is,  thus,  a  weak  inherent  commitment  to  trade  reforms  in  the 
Government’s  policy  setting.  In  situations  of  trade-offs,  whether  revenue  or 
current account deficit, it is not found unwilling to forego trade reforms, as the 
recent  developments  have  demonstrated,  even  if  there  is  little  evidence  to 
suggest that the surge in imports is a consequence of trade liberalisation, rather 
than supply-side constraints aggravated by demand growth. 
The  wavering  attitude  of  the  Pakistani  policy-makers  towards  trade 
liberalisation perhaps ensues from a less than full appreciation of  
(a)  Relevance  of  trade  reforms  to  overall  development  objectives- 
growth,  poverty  alleviation,  reduction  of  income  and  regional 
disparities, consumer interests etc. and not just to export growth.  
(b)  The  synergetic  relationship  between  trade  reform  and  the  overall 
policy and institutional environment.  
(c)  Trade policy no longer being limited to the traditional instruments of 
commercial policy—import regime, tariffs, customs administration. It 
now has to embrace ‘new issues’ as well (e.g. Services, Intellectual 
Property Rights, Behind-the-border regulatory agenda, Competition, 
Government procurement). 
It also bears reiteration that the reforms induced by the outside actors are 
tolerated (as part of the balance of payments rescue effort) rather than owned (as 
critical to improved economic performance). There is thus a weak commitment 
to these reforms that are stalled or rolled back once the outside-led programme 
is completed or aborted. 
                                                
 
19‘Mis-invoicing’ represents the difference between the figures reported by the exporting 
country and those reported by the importing country. It is understood that now there is growing 
incidence of both over-invoicing (to take advantage of subsidies) and under-invoicing (to save an 
importing country duties and sales tax) on the same transaction. 
20Siddiqui and  Kamal (2006). 
21Ahmad (2008).  
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VI.  POLICY REDUX 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the trade policy formulation in 
Pakistan  has  been  inconsistent,  not  sufficiently  focussed  on  complementarity 
with the other related policies, and unduly influenced by external actors. 
Perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the trade policy 
formulation  weaknesses  is  trade  policy’s  place  on  the  Government’s  overall 
policy agenda. Trade Policy does not seem to have a place of its own. It is often 
treated  as  a  subset  of  the  fiscal  policy.  It  is  viewed  more  as  an  export 
enhancement instrument than a tool for institutional reform and attainment of 
development objectives. There seems to be a greater awareness of the risks of 
trade liberalisation than its benefits. A freer trade regime is widely perceived as 
a  threat  rather  than  a  way  to  reduce  corruption  and  rent-seeking;  there  is  a 
reluctance to bind tariffs even though they could generate greater predictability 
in  incentives  and  solidify  property  rights.  Lack  of  genuine  stake-holder 
participation and a weak political interaction allows the fears, often misplaced, 
to persist. 
For a trade policy to move up the Government agenda the emphasis will 
have to be placed on trade policy’s role in creating the ‘quality institutional 
environment’  that  Rodrik  speaks  of.  The  trade  policy  objectives  should  go 
beyond revenues and trade balance to address the fundamental question: will the 
contemplated trade reforms improve the quality of institutions? The academia 
and the researchers will need to do more Pakistan-specific work to guide the 
policy-makers in this regard. 
The institutional arrangement for trade policy formulation is the second 
missing  link,  partly  explaining  the  policy  inconsistencies  and  questionable 
sequencing of trade reforms. While it is not intended to in any way to question 
the existing inter-ministerial division of responsibilities there is clearly the need 
for  a  sufficiently  empowered  focal  point  for  trade  policy.  Theoretically,  the 
Ministry of Commerce is expected to perform this function but its efficacy is 
reduced,  not  just  for  reasons  of  insufficient  institutional  capacity,  but  also 
because of its ‘dependency syndrome’ on agencies such as FBR and SBP—it is 
so often on the receiving end, in its pursuit of export incentives. Its ability to 
‘influence’  the  thinking  of  the  agencies  that  have  a  bearing  on  trade  policy 
matters is more personality driven than institutional. (As pointed out earlier, the 
Rules of Business do not show Trade Policy as one of MoC’s responsibilities). 
The  Federal  Export  Promotion  Board  (FEPB)  is  a  powerful  forum  but  it  is 
seldom used for policy direction purposes. It also does not meet on a regular 
basis. 
While there is not much that can or should be done about the plurality of 
trade policy actors, Ministry of Commerce needs to be categorically assigned the 
principal responsibility for trade policy formulation. Further, the FEPB, to meet 
each quarter, should be used exclusively for policy decisions and not facilitation  
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or  incentivisation.  The  over-riding  objective  should  be  for  the  trade  policy 
reform to be embedded in the institutional setting and complemented by other 
reforms. 
The way the Ministry of Commerce is currently structured it is unlikely to 
perform this enhanced role. It lacks ‘Capacity, most singularly in research and 
analysis that is needed for sound policy formulation, effectively interacting with 
other agencies, and avoiding what is demanded (by interest groups) at the cost of 
what is needed. This also diminishes its ability to ‘influence’ other agencies. 
Hiring consultants is not without its utility but cannot be a substitute for an in-
house capacity. 
MoC’s attached departments concerned with trade matters can also do 
with a massive capacity upgrade. The National Tariff Commission has seen its 
role  transformed  to  contingency  protection  ~P  trade  defence  mechanisms. 
Besides being given greater resources to 40 this better it could also be entrusted 
to undertake a competent assessment of downside risks of trade reforms. The 
new appellation of the much restructured Export Promotion Bureau, the Trade 
Development Authority, does signal a shift from promotion to development—
and from exports to trade, but it is yet to discard its earlier traditional functions 
besides  finding  it  difficult  to  extricate  itself  from  the  seemingly  perpetual 
whirlpool  of  transition.  Properly  equipped,  TDAP,  being  the  MoC’s 
implementation arm, can be a most useful source of inputs for policy making. 
The Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP) has a lot to learn from its Indian 
counterpart and ought to become for MoC what PIDE was intended to be for the 
Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. It could also playa role in 
influencing  the  mindset  of  civil  society  and  the  business  community  and 
minimising backlash against reforms. 
External influence need not necessarily be resisted. It is often benign and 
invariably well researched. By the same token it does not always have to be 
accepted. Generally speaking, external policy prescription has two weaknesses: 
it  relies  more  on  statistical  analysis  than  an  ‘intuitive  feel’  of  the  ground 
realities; and, being unsure of the period of its welcome, it seeks a faster pace of 
reform than  may be necessary.  This challenges administrative capabilities as 
well  as  social  peace,  especially  in  the  absence  of  viable  social  insurance 
institutions  or  safety  net  for  the  ‘losers’  in  the  reform  process.  Also,  the 
imperative  to  improve  export  competitiveness,  as  one  liberalises,  gets  less 
attention. 
A proper sequencing of reforms is of critical import but with the limited 
time usually available to them the external actors cannot always ensure this. It is 
only a strong domestic institutional capacity that can check the less desirable 
aspects of outside intervention. An asymmetry of capacities tends to promote 
adversarial  relationships  at  the  cost  of  partnerships  that  such  institutions  are 
intended to foster.  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
This  study  finds  more  than  a  coincidental  link  between  the  role  of 
multilateral agencies and the evolution of Pakistan’s trade policy. It is these 
agencies that have essentially guided the trade liberalisation process in Pakistan. 
Further, it is more than the dictates of globalisation that provided for such a 
pronounced role of external actors. It was in no small measure facilitated by the 
inherent weaknesses of Pakistan’s own policy making apparatus. The vacuum 
was too compelling for these agencies to ignore. 
Trade  Policy,  both  institutionally  and  in  terms  of  priorities,  has  not 
dominated  Pakistan’s  policy  agenda.  Those  who  do  believe  in  trade reforms 
come across a severe lack of commitment on the part of the decision makers. 
It  is  questionable  if  the  Ministry  of  Commerce,  supposedly  the  lead 
agency,  has  the  wherewithal,  or,  indeed,  the  responsibility  for  trade  policy 
formulation. The ‘annual trade policy’ ritual may serve some facilitation and 
export promotional purposes but it will be difficult for it to lay claim to the kind 
of institutional and wider policy reform that a genuine trade policy ought to 
seek. MoC seems to have problems enough to get its ATP proposals, barely 
touching  the  cusp  of  policy,  fully  and  properly  implemented.  It  faces  the 
challenges of inter-ministerial ‘power game’ as well as capacity. 
Capacity is not solely a Ministry of Commerce issue. It is quite endemic 
all through the policy spectrum. The study highlights the asymmetry of capacity 
between the domestic and the external actors that tends to breed suspicion and 
an aura of forced interventions. This raises questions of ownership of reforms 
and their sustainability. 
A  definitive,  evidence-based,  linkage  between  trade  liberalisation  and 
public  welfare-growth,  poverty  reduction,  income  equality—is  not  easy  to 
incontrovertibly  establish  in  the  case  of  Pakistan  that  is  exposed  to  several 
simultaneous variables. This weakens the resolve. 
The prevalent ‘street perception’ is that trade liberalisation is inimical to 
national aspirations. It is viewed as a surrogate for globalisation, which in turn is 
perceived as the new variant of imperialism. In any political setting the slogan of 
self-sufficiency—and therefore import substitution and therefore protectionism—
is almost certain to attract more votaries. No serious effort has been made to 
educate public opinion. It is often forgotten that trade policy is much more than 
trade liberalisation. If anything, a good trade policy can serve to check the costs 
of globalisation while capitalising on the opportunities. 
All  these  factors  contribute  to  trade  policy  being  relegated  to  a  low 
position in the Government’s policy making pantheon.  
The trade policy making and execution weaknesses are unlikely to be 
corrected without a realisation of their virtuous effect on the other policies and 
strategies, and how, together, they can impact public welfare. The cause of trade 
policy will be better served by restoring it to the general policy matrix rather  
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than  letting  it languish  within  the  narrow  confines of  WTO  compliance  and 
export growth. Its importance is more likely to be accepted when it is seen as an 
agent of change, contributing to transparency, consistency and predictability of 
policies; as a powerful instrument of good governance.  
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